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LEGISLATION passed in March 1980 calls
the gradual phase—out of interest rate ceilings on
deposits b 1986. Some critics of’ this change have
claimed that banks and thrift institutions will charge
their borrowers higher interest rates once these
deposit interest rate ceilings are removed. Accord-
ing to these critics, lenders will raise their lending
rates to cover their increased deposit costs.1
This article presents a brief history of deposit in-
terest rate ceilings in the United States and their
efkcts. It then describes the process estahlished h
recent legislation for eliminating ceilings, and its
likely impact on the interest ratesthat borrowers will
pay. Finally, the analysis is extended to cover the
eIik~ctsof the All Savers Certificate program on in-
terest rates that depository institutions will charge
oil loans.
WHY HAS THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT REGULATED DEPOSIT
INTEREST RATES?
Federal hank regulators received the legal author-
ity to regulate interest rates that commercial banks
may pay depositors in the Banking Acts of 1933 and
1935. The interest ceilings have been set under
Regulation Q of the Federal Reserve and, therefbre,
are commonly referred to as Regulation Q. One of
the primary reasons for imposing ceilings on deposit
interest rates was to reduce the number of Jailing
banks by reducing their interest cost. Another ob-
jective was to reduce the incentives Ibrrural banks to
hold large interest—earning balances with their cor-
respondents in the financial centers.2
Much of the concern in the early l93Os centered
on interest payments on demand deposits. Interest
payments on demand deposits were prohibited
under the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935. The max-
imum interest rate on all time and savings deposits
was initially set at 3 percent, slightly below the
average interest rate that commercial banks kind
thrift institutions had been paying on time an(l sav-
ings deposits, butchore then—existing market yields
on high—grade short—tenn securities.3 The choice of
the initial ceiling rate on time and savings deposits
indicates that the purpose of these ceiling rates on
time and savings deposits was itot to keep them
heloxv yields on alternative investments, but to re-
duce deposit rates slightly and thus lower the interest
costs of depository institutions.
l)uring the 20 years from the mid—I93Os to the
mid—l9SOs, the ceiling rates on time and savings
deposits were above market interest rates. In 1957
and 1962, when market interest rates rose near or
above the ceiling rates on savings deposits, these
ceilings were raised (chart 1).
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3-Month Treasury Bill Rate and Ceiling Rate on Savings Deposits at Commercial Banks
In 1966, interest rate ceilings were imposed on
deposits of thrift institutions. Sponsors of the en-
acting legislation assertedl that interest rates were
being driven up by competition for deposits among
banks ~md thrifts, and that ceiling interest rates on
deposits at thrift institutions would stop this escala-
tion. They assumed that by permithng slightly higher
ceiling rates atthrift institutions specializing in resi—
clential mortgage lending, there wouldl be ~made-
quate supply of credit for residential mortgages at
reasonable mortgage interest rates.4
These controls on interest rates paid by thrift
institutions were viewed initially as temporary inca—
sures to (leal with ‘‘unusual circumstances.’’ Over
time, however, thrift institutions have come to view
the difforentials between the ceiling interest rates
on their deposits andl those imposed on commercial
banks as essential in attracting deposits to Ise used
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for residential mortgage lending. These differentials
have been considered important elements of apub-
lic policydesigned toexpand the supply of mortgage
d’redlit and increase residential construction.5
Ifthe differentials in ceiling rates between thrifts
and commercial banks are to stimulate the flow of
deposits tothrift institutions, ceiling interest rates on
sonic categories of deposits at commercial banks
must be below market interest rates. If all deposit
interest rate ceilings were ttbore market interest
rates. the higher ceiling rates at thrift institutions
would not induce individuals to hold their deposits
there rather than at commercial banks. This would
occur because both commercial banks and thrifts
would be paving the lower market interest rate to
depositors instead of the higher ceiling rates. Since
1966, the ceiling rate on savings (leposits at com-
mercial banks has been below the three—month
Treasur% bill rate (a measure of market rates) except
for only a few months in 1967, 1971, 1972 and 1976—
77 (cliart I).
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THE EFFECTS OF DEPOSIT
INTEREST RATE CEILINGS
Ifmaintaining (leposit interest rate ceilings below
market interest rates, with slightly bigher rates al—
lowecl forthrift institutions, was intended to produce
a stable supply of’ mortgage credlit available to
homebuvers at moderate interest rates, it has fiuilecl
to do so. The growth of deposits at thrift institutions
has slowed whenever market interest rates have
risen above the dleposit ceiling rates.6 These fluctu-
ations in the growth of dieposits’’at thrift institutions
may have contributed to the abrupt changes in the
pace of residential construction activity in recent
c1ecades.~
Deposit interest rate ceilings have discriminated
against the relatively less wealthy sayers.8 There are
no ceiling rates on dleposits in denominations of
$100,000 or more. The ceiling rate on money market
certificates (time deposits with maturities of six
months) fluctuates with market interest rates, hut
those require a minimum dleposit of $10,000. Debt
obligations of the U.S. Treasury, investments with
risk characteristics most similar to deposits of fed-
erally insured institutions, are sold in ininimtnn
denominations that are substantially larger than the
average time or savings deposits of indlividluals.
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Consequently, savers with less than $10,000, who
want an investment with risk and liquidity charac-
teristics similar to Treasury hills, are limited to
savings deposits at federally insured institutions.
Because of the interest rate ceilings on these de-
posits, the s-’ield is generally less than that ayailable
on Treasury hills. Several studies have estimated
that savers have ‘‘lost’’ several billion slollars in
earnings as a result of the Regulation C) eeilings.~
ELIMINATING REGULATION Q
One of the most significant sections of the De-
pository Institutions Deregulation Act of’ 1980 calls
for the elimination of ceilings on dleposit interest
rates over a six—year periodl. The statement of find—
ings andl purpose of that section of the act reads as
follows:
The Congress hereby finds that
(1) limitations ciii the interest rates which are payable on
cie95)sits ansi acconIl ts discot,rage persons f i’oiii saving
money, create inequities for rleisositnrs, impede the ability
of diep5)5itory institntions to compete for fundis, alit
1
havc’
not ~uch iceseci thein pn rpo use of pros’idlii) ga ncxc- n flow of
huldis for hr)in e niortgage lendliiig; andi
(2) all Pepo sitors, ansi partictdai’ly those with ulocie st savings,
are entitiecl to receive a market rate of return on their
sas’ing.s as soon as it is economically feasible fordepository
institutions to pay such rate,~°
The act does not specify a timetable for eli m—
mating deposit interest rate ceilings, hut dlelegates
those decisions to a newly ereatedl committee: the
Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee
(DIDC). Voting members ofthe DIDC include: Sec-
retary of the Treasury; and chairmen of the Federal
Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, F’ecleral 1-Tome Loan Bank Board, and National
Credit Union Administration. The Comptroller of
the Currency isa non—voting member of tile DIDC.
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The act directs the DIDC to provide for the
orderly phase-out and ultimate elimination ofmaxi-
mum interest rates that may be paid on time and
savings deposits as rapidly as economic conditions
warrant. A primary consideration in determining
when conditions warrant raising or eliminating
these ceilings is the effect ofsuch changes on the
safety and soundness ofdepositoryinstitutions. The
act lists thefollowing methods the DIDC may use in
phasing out ceiling interest rates on deposits:
The phase-out of such limitations may be achieved by the
Deregulation Committee by the gradual increase in such
limitationsapplicabletoallexistingcategoriesofaccounts, the
complete elimination of the limitations applicable to par-
ticularcategories ofaccounts,thecitationofnewcategorieso
accounts not subjectto limitations or with limitations set at
currentmarketrates,anycombination oftheabovemethods,or
any othermethod.”
One limitation imposed on the DIDC is that it may
not raise interest rate ceilings on all deposit cate-
gories above market interest rates before March
1986.
The DIDC has taken limited actions to raise or
eliminate ceilingson depositinterest rates (seetable
1). The first significant action was to lift caps on
ceilingrates for time depositswith maturities of254
years, which was effective August 1, 1981, The
DIDC hasalso createdanewcategoryofIRA/Keogh
account (with minimum maturity of 154 years) that
will have no regulated interest rate ceiling as of
January 1, 1982.
THE EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING
REGULATION Q ON INTEREST
RATES PAID BY BORROWERS
Theeffectsofeliminatingceilingrates on deposits
cannot be determined by examining the efl~ctsof
actions alreadytaken bythe DIDC,since few actions
toeliminate the ceiling rates have been taken sofar.
Effects ofeliminating deposit ceiling rates on the
interestrates paid byborrowers must, therefore, be
analyzed by considering the effects ofeliminating
Regulation Q in the contextofatheorythatdescribes
how interest rates are determined.
The Mark-upTheory vs. the Competitive
Market Theory
There are several competing theories of how
depository institutions determine the interest rates
they charge borrowers. The two theories discussed
“Ibid., title II, sec. 204(a).
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in this section have different implications for the
impact of eliminating the ceiling rates on timeand
savings deposits specified under Regulation Q.
Tue Mark-up Theory — Those who assert that
borrowers will be chargedhigher interest rates due
to the elimination of Regulation Q are generally
using a mark-up theory: Depository institutions are
presumed todeterminethe interest ratestheycharge
borrowers asamark-upover theaverage interestrate
they pay on deposits. The average interest rate on
deposits will rise as Regulation Q is phased out,
unless market interest rates should fortuitously fill
below the Regulation Q ceilings currently in elTect.
The mark-up theory, therefore, predicts that bor-
rowers will pay higher interest rates as a conse-
quence ofthe elimination ofRegulation Q.
The Competitive Market Theory — Under this
theory, the interaction ofseveralfactors influencing
both supply and demand determine a market inter-
est rate, which all lenders charge on loans with
similar characteristics. Lenders can make few loans
at interest rates above the market rate, since bor-
rowers will search for the lowest rate available.
Since lenders can make all the loans they wishat the
market rate, they have no incentive to lend at in-
terest rates below the market rate.
To describe this theory in more detail, consider
the determinants of the market interest rate on a
particularcategory ofcredit — residential mortgage
loans. Demand for residential mortgage credit is
determinedby personal incomeandthe preferences
ofindividuals for housing and forhome ownership.
Several factors influence the supply of residential
mortgage credit. Onefactoris the interestratesonin-
vestments other than residential mortgages. If, for
instance, yieldsrise on U.S. Treasury securitieswith
maturities similar to those ofresidential mortgages,
depository institutions and other suppliers of resi-
dential mortage credit will supply less mortgage
credit at each level of the mortgage interest rate.
Another important determinant of supply is the
interestrate on deposits not subject to Regulation Q
ceilings. For example, depository institutions may
pay whatever interest rate they wish on time de-
posits in denominations of$100,000 ormore. In the
competitive market, depository institutions will bid
up the interest rates they are willing to pay on
depositsfree of Regulation Q ceilings until these
rates are sufficiently close to their lending rates to
eliminate the incentives to make additional loans.
Consequently, it is the interest ratethatdepository
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institutions pay on deposits ui~ caustrunied by rates kr borrowers, ifindividuals are induced to save
Regulation 9 that influences the interest rates they more of their income in response to the higher inter—
charge on loans. est rates available on deposits.
tinder the competitive market theory, achange in The effects of eliminafing Regulation 9 under the
Regulation Q ceilings will affect interest rates on competitive market theory are in sharp contrast to
residential mortgages only if it affrcts interest rates the effects under the mark—up theory. The mark—up
on unregulated deposits or on alternative invest— theory predicts that the elimination of Regulation 9
ments. One inplication of this theory is that elim— would cause interest rates paid by borrowers to rise,
mating Regulation 9 ceilings might reduce interest while the competitive market theory suggests that
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Chart 2
Comparison of Mortgage Interest Rate with Cost of Funds
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interest rates on loans would either he unaffected or
would decline.
What’s the Evidence? — Chart 2 presents some
evidence on whether U.S. interest rates on residen-
tial mortgages are cletennined according to the mark-
upor competitive market theory. The average costof
funds to savings and loan associations (S&Ls) over
Chart 2 clearly indicates that there is no fixed
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and the average interest rate on residential mort-
gages. The difference between the average mort-
gage interest rate and the average cost of hinds to
S&Ls hasvariedwidely, from 165basis pointsin the
firsthalfof1966 to 386basis points in the first halfof
1980.
Chart 2 shows that there is a much closer rela-
tionshipbetweenthe average mortgage interest rate
and the average yield on U.S. Treasury securities
with maturities of 10 years than the relationship
between the mortgage interest rate and the avenge
cost of hinds.12 The difference between the mort-
gage interest rateandtheyield on 10-year Treasury
bonds has a standard deviation of 27 basis points,
compared with a standard deviation of 59 basis
points for the difference between the mortgage
interest rate and the average cost of hinds toS&Ls.
Thesecomparisons provideevidence thatinterest
rates on residential mortgages are determined in a
competitive credit market Homebuyers must pay
interest rates onmortgagesthat arecompetitive with
yieldson alternative investments inorderto receive
credit.
Chart 3 presents additional evidence on whether
interest rates aredetermined according tothe mark-
up or thecompetitive market theory. The difference
between the primeloanrate charged by commercial
banks and the average interest rate they pay their
depositors on total time and savings deposits is
highly variable, rangingfrom 49basis points in 1972
to 461 basis points in 1980. Thus, once again, there
appears to be no fixed mark-up between the prime
rate and the average interest rate paid on time and
savings deposits.
There is a much closer relationship, however,
between the prime loan rate and the rate thatcom-
mercial banks pay on their three-month certificates
of deposit, which are free ofRegulation Q ceilings.
The differential between the prime rate and the
three-month certificate of deposit yield has a
standarddeviation of73 basispoints, comparedwith
a standard deviation of 144 basis points for the
differential between the prime rate and the average
interest rate paid on time and savings deposits.
Again, the interest rate relationships presented in
‘tThe conclusion that mortgage interest rates are more closely
relatedto theyield on U.S. Treasury securities with maturities
of 10 years than to the average cost ofhinds to S&Ls has been
conAnned using regression analysis. See Thomas Mayer and
Harold Nathan, “MortgageRates and Regulation Q,” Working
Paper SeriesNo. 111 (DepartmentofEconomics, Universityof
Californiaat DavIs, July 1981).
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chart 3 are more consistent with the competitive
market theory than with the mark-up theory.
Is the Mongage Market
Separate From Other Credit Markets?
Despite the above evidence suggesting that in-
terest rates charged borrowers are more closely
related to market interest rates uncontrolled by
Regulation Qthan to the average interest ratespaid
on deposits, the possibility that the elimination of
Regulation Q would increase the interest rates paid
by one class ofborrowers — homebuyers — has not
been ruledout,Thispossibility, produced bycertain
regulations and tax incentives affectingthrift insti-
tutions, Is discussed in this section.
Since 1966, the existence of higher ceilings on
their deposit interest rates have given thrift insti-
tutions an advantage over commercialbanks in at-
ti-acting deposits. At the same time, however, thrift
institutions arefacedwith regulations thatlimit their
investments in types ofassets other than mortgages.
In addition to these regulations, thrift institutions
are also given tax incentives to specialize in resi-
dential mortgage lending: The deductions from
gross income allocated to bad debt reserves, which
are, therefore,notsubject toincome tax, arelargerfor
institutions that invest more of their assets in
mortgages.
As a result of the higher ceiling interest rates
allowable (which attract deposits) and the regula-
tions andtax incentives thatfavormortgagelending,
thrift institutions might charge residentialmortgage
lendingrates thatare below marketinterest rates(on
securities with characteristics similar to residential
mortgages). Eliminating Regulation Q would re-
move the advantage that thrift institutions have in
attracting deposits. As a result, the share of credit
channeled to residential mortgages would decline
and interest rates on residential mortgages would
rise relative to other interest rates.
This result is unlikely for several reasons. First,
thereactionsby othersuppliersofcreditwouldtend
to offset these effects, as long as non-thrift institu-
tions aremaking residential mortgage loans aswell. If
thrift institutions increase the amount of mortgage
credit they offer at prevailing interest rates, other
lenders will simply reduce the quantity of resi-
dential mortgage credit they supply, shifting their
investments to other sectors of the credit market.
The net result might be no change in mortgage in-
terest rates, but an increase in the proportion of
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Chart 3
Relationship Between the Commercial Bank Prime Rate
and Selected Deposit Interest Rates
residential mortgage loans nmde by thrift institu-
tions relative to non—thrift institutions.
Of course, it is possible that the increase in the
supplyof mortgage credit by thrifts may notbejhllq
offset by reductions in supply by other lenders.
Again, however, an increase in the net supply of
residential mortgage credit would not necessarily
depress mortgage interest rates relative to yields on
alternative investments. The reason is that pre-
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tend tooffset the effects ofthis shiftin the supplyon
mortgage interest rates. Suppose that, initially,
interestrates on residential mortgagesare decreased
relative to other market interest rates due to an
increase in the supply of deposits and mortgage
loans at thriftinstitutions. This triggers increases in
the quantity of mortgage credit demanded at pre-
vailing mortgage interest rates until these rates are,
once again, in line with other interest rates. There
are a variety of reactions by individuals that would
causean increase in demand formortgagecredit. For
example, those seeking to borrow to invest in
business firms would take out second mortgages on
their homes rather than seek business loans at
commercial banks. Also, individuals buying homes
would obtain mortgages with smaller percentage
downpayments, and invest their wealth instead at
interest rates higher than the rates they pay on
mortgages.
There is a simple method to test whether the
residential mortgage market is truly separate from
other credit markets. We can determine this by ex-
amining the correlation between the difference of
the average mortgage interest rate and the yield on
10-year Treasury bonds with the rate ofgrowth in
time and savings deposits at mutual savings banks
and savings and loan associations. Ifthe correlation
issignificantly negative — ifthe spreadbetweenthe
mortgage interest rate and the 10-year bond rate
tends to narrow when time and savings deposits at
thrift institutions grow at a faster rate — the resi-
dential mortgage market is, to some extent, sepa-
ratedfrom othercredit markets. When theirdeposits
increase rapidly, thrift institutions reduce the
mortgage interest rate relative to other interest rates
in order to acquire enough residential mortgagesto
retain the tax advantages from specializing in
mortgage lending.
In fact, the correlation between the interest rate
spread and the growth rate of time and savings
deposits at thrift institutions is positive. Using
monthly observations from January 1968 through
July 1981, thecorrelationcoefficient is 0.234, which
is statistically significant at the one percent level.
Using quarterly averages for 111968 through 1111981,
the correlation coefficient is 0.262, which is not stat-
tistiailly significant at the five percent level.
This resultconfirmsthe conclusion reached inthe
previous section. The competitive market theory is
consistent with the actual behavior ofinterest rates.
Therefore, eliminating Regulation Q would not




The analysis presented above has implications for
the effects of the All Savers Certificate (ASC) pro-
gram on interest rates paid by borrowers at depos-
itory institutions. ASCs are special time deposits
with maturities ofoneyear. TheceilingrateonASCs
is equal to 70 percent ofthe average yield set in the
most recentauctionofone-yearTreasury securities.’3
Individuals may declare up to $1,000 in interest on
ASCs tax free (up to $2,000 on joint returns).
Depository institutions issuing ASCs are receiv-
ing deposits at interestrates belowmarketrates. For
individuals subject to relatively high marginal tax
rates, the tax-free yield on ASCs is greater than the
after-tax return on many alternative investments.
Depository institutions are required to invest 75
percent of the funds raised by issuing ASCs in
housing and agricultural loans. Details ofthe legis-
lation and the regulations issued to implement the
program provide depository institutions withagreat
deal of flexibility in meeting these investment re-
quirements.The objectives forestablishingthe ASC
program, however, included increasing the amount
of credit available to the housing and agricultural
sectors ofthe credit market.
The structure of regulations tinder the ASC pro-
gram is similar to that for promoting mortgage
lending by thrift institutions. Differentials in Reg-
ulation Q ceilings have given thrift institutions
advantages in attracting deposits, and thrifts have
been given tax incentives to specialize in mortgage
lending. All depository institutions that take ad-
vantage of the ASC program to attract deposits at
interest rates below market rates are required to
allocate increases in their assets to certain sectors
of the credit market
The analysis developed earlier indicates thatthe
inflowofdeposits at institutions given inducements
to specialize in mortgage lending has not lowered
the level ofmortgage interest rates relative to other
1~TTeastuysecrities with maturities of one year are generally
auctioned every fourweeks on aThursday. The average yield
on aThursday auction determines the new ceIling rate on All
Savers Certificates beginning the followIng Monday.
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rates.The ASC programis therefore unlikely to have
any appreciable impact onthe interest ratescharged
on housing and agricultural loans relative to other
interest rates. The ASC program may have some
effect on the quantity of housing and agricultural
loans, as depository institutions and their borrowers
develop methods of classifring loans in the cate-
gories that will meet the investment requirements
ofthe ASC program. Theprimaryeffects ofthe ASC
program will be to reduce the interest costs of de-
pository institutions andthe income taxofinvestors.
THE EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING
REGULATION Q ON PROFITS OF
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
Eliminating Regulation Q will raise the interest
rates paid to depositors relative to market interest
rates. The evidence cited above indicates thatbor-
rowers at depository institutions will notpay higher
interestrates due tothe elimination ofRegulation Q.
Decontrol of interest rates paidon deposits, there-
fore,will tendtoreducethenet incomeofdepository
institutions.
Several studies indicate, however, that the net
incomeofdepository institutions willnot decline by
the hill amount of the increase in interest paid on
deposits. Because interest rate ceilings on deposits
have been below market interest rates, depository
institutions have increased expenditures to attract
deposits by means other than increasing interest
payments on deposits.14 These non-interest expen-
ditures to attractdeposits are estimated atbetween
40 and 50 percent of the direct interest expense
depository institutions saved by paying only the
ceiling interest rates on depositsrather than market
interest rates.15
Although depository institutions can quickly
eliminate some types ofnon-interest expenditures
made to attract deposits, such asgifts ofmerchandise
for depositorswhoopen oradd to accounts,they will
incur losses in eliminating other expenditures. One
major expenditure intended to attract deposits has
“Thomas Eric Kilcollin and GeraldA. Hanweclc, “Regulation Q
and Commercial Bank Profitability,” Research Papers In
Banking and Financial Economics (Boardof Governors ofthe
Federal Reserve System, 1981).
IsTaggaft, “Effects of Deposit Rate Ceilings,” and Lewis 3.
Spellman, “Deposit Ceilings and the Efficiency of Financial
Intennedlation,”Journai ofFinance (March 1980), pp. 129-36.
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beenthe openingofbranch offices, Since depository
institutions have not been allowed to compete di-
rectly on the basis ofinterest rates they offer to pay
on deposits, theyhave beencompetingindirectly by
offering convenient locations for depository ser-
vices.1’ Many branches that were profitable when
Regulation Q ceilings were below market interest
rates will become unprofitable when depositinter-
estrate ceilings are lifted.
CONCLUSIONS
Under the directives of the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation Act of 1980, the Depository In-
stitutions Deregulation Committee is in the process
of lifting interest rate ceilings on time and savings
deposits. That committee has taken some steps to
raise the ceilings, butthe most significantactions to
eliminate the ceilings on deposit interest rates are
yet to come.
Some supporters of ceilings on deposit interest
rates claim thateliminating the ceilings will cause
depository institutions to raise the interestratesthey
charge borrowers. An analysis ofinterest rates does
not support this view. Interest rates paid by bor-
rowers are determined by market rates that are
exempt from Regulation Q ceilings. Consequently,
elimination ofRegulation Q ceilings will not cause
loan rates to rise, but may cause them to decline if
depositors save more with higher deposit interest
rates. Profits of depository institutions will not
declineby the full amount ofthe increase in interest
expense resulting from eliminating Regulation Q,
since these institutions will eliminate some non-
interest costs that were incurred to attract deposits
when Regulation Q ceilings were binding.
Similarimplications also hold forthe effects ofthe
All Savers Certificate program on interest rates paid
by borrowers. Although depository institutions are
requiredto invest at least 75 percent ofhinds raised
by issuing All Savers Certificates in housing and
agricultural loans, that requirement is unlikely to
resultin lower interest ratesonsuch loansrelative to
other market interest rates.
“Lawrence J. White,“Price Regulation and Quality Rivalry ina
Profit-maximizingModel: The Case ofBank Branching,”Jour-
‘wiofMoney,Creditand Banking (February 1976), pp. 97-106;
andWilliamM. Peterson,“TheEffectsofInterest Rate Ceilings
on the Numberof Banking Offices In the United States,” Re-
search Paper No. 8103 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
1981).
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